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THE AWARENESS OF 
WRONGDOING REQUIREMENTS IN 
THE WAKE OF HAZELWOOD 
BRIAN FLANAGAN* 
ABSTRACT 
State v. Hazelwood shook Alaska’s jurisprudence and suggested the end of 
the due process requirement of awareness of wrongdoing for serious criminal 
convictions. However, prior and subsequent case law suggest a more limited 
principle that the awareness of wrongdoing requirement only applies to cases 
involving omission liability or willful violation, not to the entirety of criminal 
law, and Hazelwood would survive only as an extension of this distinction. 
Still, premising such a requirement on judicial classification of offenses as 
positive action or omission liability does not appear to have emerged by 
design, and the result has the potential for inconsistency, arbitrariness, and 
misapplication. This Note first demonstrates that the only recognizable 
pattern to emerge from the case law is to require an awareness of wrongdoing 
for omission offenses and for violations of statutes that specifically require 
willful violation and second argues that the requirement of awareness of 
wrongdoing should not hinge on omission versus affirmative action liability, 
because it has too great a potential for arbitrary and inconsistent application. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Alaska Constitution prohibits the deprivation of “life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law,” and guarantees a right to “fair 
and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive 
investigations.”1 In Speidel v. State,2 the Alaska Supreme Court held that 
a felony conviction for inadvertent or negligent action violates the 
defendant’s right to due process.3 The court stated that an injury could 
 
 *     J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2013. B.S. in political 
science, The University of Pennsylvania, 2010. Thank you to Bob and Tanci 
Mintz for hosting me during my visit to Anchorage. Also, thank you to all of the 
members of the Alaska Law Review for their support and friendship. Any 
omissions or errors remain my own. 
 1.  ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
 2.  460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969). 
 3.  Id. at 80. 
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only amount to a crime when the individual charged with the crime had 
an “awareness or consciousness of some wrongdoing.”4 The Alaska 
Supreme Court has subsequently refused to impose convictions for 
negligent conduct and has required a demonstration that the defendant 
had an awareness of wrongdoing.5 In 1997, however, the Alaska 
Supreme Court stated in State v. Hazelwood6 that negligence could serve 
as the criminal intent necessary to support a conviction, and further that 
the requirement to demonstrate criminal intent does not require the 
State to demonstrate an awareness of wrongdoing.7 
Some critics go so far as to say that Hazelwood is irreconcilable with 
the Alaska jurisprudence.8 Not only does the fundamental contrast in 
language support such an argument, but also no decision that cites 
Hazelwood additionally cites Speidel or forbids convictions absent a 
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing.9 However, other decisions since 
 
 4.  Id. at 78. 
 5.  See Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska 1971) (holding that “[t]his 
court . . . will not now sanction conviction of a serious felony for mere 
inadvertence or simple neglect.”); Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska 
1978) (“It is well-settled that an act or omission can result in serious criminal 
liability only when a person has the requisite criminal intent.”); Hentzner v. 
State, 613 P.2d 821, 826 (Alaska 1980) (“Where the crime involved may be said to 
be malum in se, that is, one which reasoning members of society regard as 
condemnable, awareness of the commission of the act necessarily carries with it 
an awareness of wrongdoing. In such a case the requirement of criminal intent is 
met upon proof of conscious action, and it would be entirely acceptable to define 
the word ‘wilfully’ to mean no more than a consciousness of the conduct in 
question.”). 
 6.  946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997). 
 7.  Id. at 878–79. 
 8.  See Lee Perla, Note, Mens Rea in Alaska: From Bad Thoughts to No 
Thoughts?, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 139, 162 (2006) (“The cases cited are not persuasive 
inasmuch as they ignore Alaska’s prior jurisprudence and legislative history.”). 
 9.  See Solomon v. State, 227 P.3d 461, 468–69 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) 
(“Solomon argues that imposition of criminal liability without proof that the 
defendant had at least some level of subjective awareness of wrongdoing 
violates the guarantee of due process of law. But this argument was rejected by 
our supreme court in State v. Hazelwood”); Valentine v. State, 155 P.3d 331, 341–
42 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) (“Valentine acknowledges that this court has 
repeatedly held that the offense of driving while under the influence does not 
require proof that the defendant was aware that he was legally impaired or that 
his blood alcohol level was above the legal limit—it is enough that the defendant 
knowingly drank and knowingly drove.”); Latham v. State, A-7198, 2000 WL 
1124502, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2000) (“A person commits the crime of 
vehicle theft in the first degree if he had no right nor any reasonable ground to 
believe he had such a right and he knowingly took or drove the propelled 
vehicle of another.”); Schmidt v. State, A-8669, 2005 WL 767071, at *6 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Apr. 6, 2005) (“But once a person has been convicted of an offense 
requiring proof of a culpable mental state, including civil negligence, factors 
other than culpability govern the amount of the fine.”). 
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Hazelwood continue to require that the State demonstrate that the 
defendant had an “awareness of wrongdoing” or else hold that a 
conviction of the defendant violates his or her right to due process.10 
Consequently, despite the language of the decision, Hazelwood did not 
overturn Speidel either explicitly or implicitly. 
Given this history, what demonstration of criminal intent satisfies 
due process, and when must the State demonstrate that the defendant 
possessed an awareness of wrongdoing in order to convict him or her? 
The Alaska Court of Appeals managed to create a rule, compatible with 
the case law, that the defendant must possess an awareness of 
wrongdoing, and therefore cannot be convicted under a negligence 
theory, in two situations.11 
First, the defendant cannot be convicted, absent an awareness of 
wrongdoing, if the statute under which the defendant is charged 
proscribes “willful” violation.12 Such a rule derives from a basic process 
of statutory interpretation in that the courts simply assign meaning to 
the term “willful,” and so this rule does not merit additional attention. 
Second, the defendant cannot be convicted, absent an awareness of 
wrongdoing, if the underlying criminal action was an omission.13 An 
 
 10.  See, e.g., Dailey v. State, 65 P.3d 891, 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (“In 
other words, to convict Dailey of failure to file sworn written quarterly 
verifications, the State had to prove both that Dailey was aware of the 
circumstances giving rise to his duty to file sworn quarterly written verifications 
and that he knowingly refrained from performing that duty.”); State v. Strane, 61 
P.3d 1284, 1292 (Alaska 2003); Moffitt v. State, 207 P.3d 593, 595 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2009); Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 132 P.3d 1176, 1185 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2006); Trigg v. State, A-7519, 2003 WL 294363, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 12, 
2003); Willis v. State, 57 P.3d 688, 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); Hutchison v. State, 
27 P.3d 774, 778 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). 
 11.  See Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241, 1252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) 
(“Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s use of criminal recklessness as a 
measure of the criminal intent requirement applicable to Wheeler’s charges of 
selling unregistered securities fully complied with the court’s duty, under 
Hentzner, to inform the jury that Wheeler could be convicted only if he acted 
with an awareness of wrongdoing.”); McGee v. State, 162 P.3d 1251, 1258–59 
(Alaska 2007); Kinney v. State, 927 P.2d 1289, 1294 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); Steve 
v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 122 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994). 
 12.  See Wheeler, 659 P.2d at 1252 (“Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s 
use of criminal recklessness as a measure of the criminal intent requirement 
applicable to Wheeler’s charges of selling unregistered securities fully complied 
with the court’s duty, under Hentzner, to inform the jury that Wheeler could be 
convicted only if he acted with an awareness of wrongdoing.”); McGee, 162 P.3d 
at 1258–59. 
 13.  See Steve, 875 P.2d at 122 (“The result in both cases can be explained by 
the rule that, when criminal liability is predicated on a person’s failure to 
perform an act required by law, the government must at a minimum show (1) 
that the defendant was aware of the circumstances that created the legal duty to 
act, and (2) that the defendant voluntarily refrained from performing the act.”); 
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omission, in contrast to a positive action, is a “failure to act . . . or [a] 
failure to act under circumstances giving rise to a legal duty to act.”14 
Some would place more constitutional restrictions on the government 
when the government creates omission offenses rather than positive 
action offenses, because the former compels rather than forbids conduct, 
and therefore imposes a greater burden on free action.15 They would 
welcome an “awareness of wrongdoing” requirement for omission 
offenses. However, premising an awareness of wrongdoing requirement 
on whether or not an offense is a positive action or omission offense is 
dangerous because a statute could be written in either form and still 
proscribe or compel virtually identical conduct. As positive action and 
omission offenses function more alike than not, it does not make sense 
to have a different constitutional requirement for each of them. That the 
Alaska Court of Appeals has already misstated positive action offenses 
as omission offenses exemplifies how easily the distinction can be 
blurred.16 
This Note will demonstrate how the Alaska Court of Appeals’ rule 
of imposing an awareness of wrongdoing requirement in cases in which 
the defendant was charged under a statute that requires willful violation 
or a statute that creates omission liability adequately encompasses the 
case law and provides a workable estimate for when Alaska courts will 
require that the State prove the defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing in 
order to support a conviction. However, it criticizes the emphasis on 
distinguishing between positive action and omission cases. 
Section I of this Note will review the history of the due process 
protection of the mens rea requirement in Alaska preceding Hazelwood. It 
will conclude that a rule imposing an awareness of wrongdoing 
requirement in cases which premise liability on either willful violation 
or omission adequately encapsulates the history of the requirement. 
Section II will analyze State v. Hazelwood in the context of that case law 
and will conclude that Hazelwood does not violate the rule of the Alaska 
Court of Appeals, as the relevant statute in Hazelwood neither proscribed 
 
Kinney, 927 P.2d at 1294. 
 14.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2 (2d ed. 2006). 
 15.  See George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142 
U. PA. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (1994) (“[P]rohibiting actions represents a lesser 
incursion in our liberty than requiring particular actions (that is, punishing their 
omission). As the argument goes, it is less intrusive to prohibit flag burning than 
it is to require children to pledge allegiance to the flag. The former only 
eliminates one of many ways of expressing contempt for the state; the latter 
requires people to submit their bodies to motions dictated by the state.”). 
 16.  See, e.g., Trigg v. State, A-7519, 2003 WL 294363, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Feb. 12, 2003) (finding the court of appeals misstated section 45.55.070 of the 
Alaska Statutes as an omission offense). 
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willful violation nor imposed omission liability. Section III will review 
the cases since Hazelwood. It again concludes that the rule adequately 
encompasses the application of the requirement on the cases following 
Hazelwood, and thus should serve as the rule for practitioners who later 
attempt to estimate whether courts will require that the State prove the 
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing.  Finally, Section IV will point out 
the dangers of premising a condition of awareness of wrongdoing on 
omission liability. 
I. THE HISTORY OF MENS REA PROTECTION IN ALASKA 
This Section, divided into three Subsections, analyzes the case law 
preceding State v. Hazelwood. Subsection A examines cases providing the 
strongest language in support of a universal requirement of subjective 
awareness of wrongdoing; Subsection B examines cases premising 
liability on negligence instead of subjective awareness; Subsection C 
examines the court of appeals decisions immediately preceding 
Hazelwood that began to apply the awareness of wrongdoing 
requirement only to offenses premised on omission liability or offenses 
requiring willful violation.  
A.  The Development of the Awareness of Wrongdoing Requirement 
In Speidel v. State,17 the Alaska Supreme Court declared that a 
felony conviction absent a criminal intent deprives the defendant of due 
process of the law.18 The relevant statute in this case criminalized 
individuals who “willfully neglect” to return a motor vehicle.19 The 
statute additionally provided the definition of the mens rea under which 
the defendant was ultimately convicted. The statute defined the mens rea 
of “willfully neglects” to mean “omits, fails, or forbears, with a 
conscious purpose to injure, or without regards for the rights of the 
owner, or with indifference whether a wrong is done the owner or 
not.”20 The Alaska Supreme Court invalidated the statute because it 
permitted persons to receive a felony sentence despite having an 
 
 17.  460 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1969). 
 18.   Id. at 80. 
 19.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.026(a) (1969) (“A person in possession of a motor 
vehicle under an agreement in writing which requires him to return the vehicle 
to a particular place or at a particular time who refuses or willfully neglects to 
return it . . . is, upon conviction, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
five years.”) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.320(a) (2012)). 
 20.  ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.026(b) (1969) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 
28.35.320(b) (2012)). 
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innocent mind.21 The court accepted the “with conscious purpose to 
injure” part of the definition, but it rejected the criminalization of failing 
to return a vehicle "without regard for the rights of the owner" or "with 
indifference whether a wrong is done the owner or not." The court 
reasoned that such a definition could lead to one being guilty under the 
statue even in the absence of "any conscious deprivation of property or 
intentional injury.”22 
Ultimately, the court held that for an injury to be considered a 
crime it must be “inflicted by intention,” and the defendant must have 
acted with an “awareness or consciousness of some wrongdoing.”23 
However, the court neither defines awareness or consciousness of 
wrongdoing nor outlines how future prosecutors must prove it. 
The Alaska Supreme Court would not go so far as to forbid public 
welfare offenses, signaling to the legislature that it could criminalize 
conduct absent awareness of culpability if the penalty were minimal and 
the danger to society necessitated criminalization.24 Consequently, the 
court highlighted that the penalty assigned to section 28.35.026 of the 
Alaska Statutes was a felony throughout the decision.25  
The statute at issue in Speidel involved a “failure to return,” 
allowing future courts to interpret Speidel as requiring a showing of 
more than mere negligence only for omission cases.26 However, the 
Speidel court did not discuss omissions, but instead prefaced its 
discussion with, “[a]lthough an act may have been objectively wrongful . 
. . ,”27 signaling that the court never intended to draw such a distinction. 
In 1971 the Alaska Supreme Court analyzed the awareness of 
 
 21.  Speidel, 460 P.2d at 79. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 78. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 78–80 (“Under the terms of ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.026 (2012) there is 
no escape from a felony conviction and a possible five-year prison term for 
simple neglectful or negligent failure to return a rented automobile at the time 
specified in the rental agreement. To make such an act, without consciousness of 
wrongdoing or intention to inflict injury, a serious crime, and criminals of those 
who fall within its interdiction, is inconsistent with the general law. To convict a 
person of a felony for such an act, without proving criminal intent, is to deprive 
such a person of due process of law.”). 
 26.  See Steve v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 122 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (“The result 
in both cases [Speidel and Kimoktoak] can be explained by the rule that, when 
criminal liability is predicated on a person’s failure to perform an act required 
by law, the government must at a minimum show (1) that the defendant was 
aware of the circumstances that created the legal duty to act, and (2) that the 
defendant voluntarily refrained from performing the act.”). 
 27.  Speidel, 460 P.2d at 80 (emphasis added). 
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wrongdoing requirement in Alex v. State,28 and the court held that the 
awareness requirement was inherently satisfied in cases where 
defendants were aware of their positive actions. It did so by first 
qualifying the Speidel decision by stating that the awareness of 
wrongdoing standard requires the defendant’s intent to be 
“commensurate with the conduct proscribed.”29 Thus, the court rejected 
a requirement of the awareness of law, but instead only required an 
awareness of facts.30 Given this standard, the court upheld the 
defendant’s conviction because the judge’s instruction required the jury 
to find that the defendant was aware of his conduct.31 
The awareness of conduct standard leaves ambiguity in negligence 
statutes, specifically in whether or not one can be aware of his or her 
own negligence. The court clearly did not intend to permit convictions 
under a theory of negligence, stating that it would not sanction 
conviction of a serious felony for mere inadvertence or simple neglect.32 
Still, the court subtly shied away from assigning constitutional 
protection to the awareness of wrongdoing requirement.33  
Next, in Kimoktoak v. State,34 the Alaska Supreme Court held that 
omission liability offenses would require the State to demonstrate the 
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing. The Court found section 
28.35.060 of the Alaska Statutes constitutionally defective on its face for 
failing to require criminal intent.35 The court invalidated the statute 
because, while it required the operator of a vehicle in an accident to give 
information and provide assistance to other victims of the accident, it 
did not even require the vehicle operator to know that an accident or 
injuries had occurred.36 To resolve the constitutionally impermissible 
 
 28.  484 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1971). 
 29.  Id. at 681. 
 30.  Id. (“What is essential is not an awareness that a given conduct is a 
‘wrongdoing’ in the sense that it is proscribed by law, but rather, an awareness 
that one is committing the specific acts which are defined by law as a 
‘wrongdoing.’”). 
 31.  Id. at 682 (“The trial court’s instructions required the jury to find that 
Alex left the Palmer camp intentionally and, therefore, with an awareness of his 
conduct.”). 
 32.  Id. at 681. 
 33.  Id. (“The goal of these cases is to avoid criminal liability for innocent or 
inadvertent conduct. The use of the phrase ‘awareness of wrongdoing’ is but one 
means of assuring this result.”). 
 34. 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978). 
 35. Id. at 29–30. 
 36. Kimoktoak, 584 P.2d at 29 (“ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.060 does not require that 
a person have knowledge of the accident or of the fact that injuries have resulted 
to be guilty of a serious crime. Thus, the statute appears to hold a person strictly 
liable for failure to render assistance even if he is unaware of any wrongdoing, 
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lack of an intent requirement, the court assigned to the statute a 
requirement that the driver “knowingly fails to stop and render 
assistance.”37 
Finally, in Hentzner v. State,38 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a 
“willful” violation of the Securities Act required the State to prove the 
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing.39 The court distinguished the 
case from Alex, as Alex involved a malum in se offense and so awareness 
of conduct in that case satisfied the awareness of wrongdoing 
requirement.40 However, the violation of the Securities Act in Hentzner 
was a malum prohibitum offense.41 Therefore, awareness of the conduct 
alone could not satisfy the awareness of wrongdoing requirement, but 
instead the State must prove a separate element of the offense.42  
However, the discussion over willfulness would overshadow the 
discussion over malum in se versus malum prohibitum offenses. The 
Alaska Supreme Court definitively stated that it would “construe 
‘wilfully’ . . . to require an awareness of wrongdoing.”43 The court 
asserted such a definition not simply because of due process protection, 
but because of basic statutory interpretation as the Supreme Court and 
other federal courts have consistently read willfully in criminal statutes 
to require an awareness of wrongdoing.44 Through this straightforward 
 
i.e., unaware of the circumstances giving rise to the duty and thus unaware that 
he is in fact failing to do the required act.”). 
 37. Id. at 31. “Failing to do the required act” ultimately becomes the 
language used to distinguish Kimoktoak as an omission liability case and thus 
justifies the decision’s application only to other omission liability cases. In 
Kimoktoak, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that the statute’s requirement 
of an action rather than its the forbidding of an action was instrumental to the 
court’s requirement that the State prove knowledge of the circumstance in order 
to support a conviction. Consequently, this decision introduces the principle that 
omission offenses require an awareness of wrongdoing while positive action 
offenses do not. Id. 
 38. 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980). 
 39. Id. at 826. 
 40. Id. A malum in se offense is “one in which reasoning members of society 
regard as condemnable.” Id. 
 41. Id. A malum prohibitum offense is one in which “there is no broad societal 
concurrence that it is inherently bad.” Id. 
 42. Id. The court took care to distinguish an awareness of wrongdoing from 
an awareness of illegality, stating that the Speidel court interpreted the awareness 
of wrongdoing as a purpose to injure, and, specific to securities law, alluding to 
other jurisdictions which found awareness of wrongdoing as “evil motive or 
purpose” and “deliberately with bad purpose.” In this sense, while an 
awareness of illegality would not be necessary to demonstrate an awareness of 
wrongdoing, it would be sufficient. Id. at 828. 
 43. Id. at 827. 
 44. Id. at 827, 827 n.12 (citing United States v. Murdoch, 290 U.S. 389 (1933)). 
Murdoch stated that in the past fifty years the United States Supreme Court has 
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discussion, Hentzner ultimately stands for the premise that a willful 
violation requires an awareness of wrongdoing, regardless of omission 
or positive action liability. 
B. The Move Toward A Negligence Standard 
In State v. Guest, 45 the Alaska Supreme Court examined a statutory 
rape statute that was silent on the matters of intent and the mistake of 
fact defense. The court followed the path set in Kimotoak and read a 
mistake of fact defense into the statute to avoid striking it as 
unconstitutional.46 The court held that, “if an accused had a reasonable 
belief that the person with whom he had sexual intercourse was sixteen 
years of age or older, he may not be convicted of statutory rape.”47 
Although the court does not explicitly say so, requiring a reasonable 
belief as to the victim’s age effectively allows the State to overcome the 
defense by showing only the defendant was negligent.  
Consequently, Guest becomes a foundation for Rice and Hazelwood 
in that it creates precedent for basing convictions on negligence as to a 
factual circumstance, in apparent contrast with the previously discussed 
case law. That the defendant may be negligent to a circumstance rather 
than his conduct as a whole is no issue, because the circumstance of the 
sexual partner’s age alone separates the conduct from otherwise legal 
behavior, in this case consensual sexual intercourse.  
In State v. Rice,48 the Alaska Supreme Court stated what it implied 
in Guest, that a conviction based upon negligence about a circumstance 
meets due process requirements.49 The defendant was convicted of 
violating 5 Alaska Administrative Code 81.140(b), which provided: “No 
person may possess or transport any game or parts of game illegally 
taken.”50 The court read into the statute a requirement that the 
defendant reasonably should have known that the game or parts of the 
game were illegally taken.51 Conversely, “the element of negligence 
must be read into 5 AAC 81.140(b).”52 
 
repeatedly construed ‘willfully’ as used in criminal statutes to include at the 
least an awareness of wrongdoing. Id. See also Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 
492, 498 (1943); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 
U.S. 955 (1971). 
 45.  583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978). 
 46.  Id. at 838–39. 
 47.  Id. at 839 (emphasis added). 
 48.  626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981). 
 49.  Id. at 110. 
 50.  ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 § 81.140(b) (1981) (repealed 1985). 
 51.  Rice, 626 P.2d at 110. 
 52.  Id. 
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This stands in conflict with the language and logic of the previously 
mentioned cases. The circumstance of the game being illegally taken is 
all that separates the conduct from the otherwise legal behavior of 
transporting game.  Still, because the statute in Rice, as in Guest, did not 
require willful violation and did not impose omission liability, future 
courts would be able to distinguish between these cases and the four 
discussed in Subsection A.53 
Additionally, the language in Rice leaves ample room to question 
how future courts should treat the case. First, the court in Rice left 
ambiguous whether or not 5 AAC 81.140(b) is a public welfare offense. 
On the one hand, it is a fishing and hunting regulation, which frequently 
qualifies as a public welfare offense.54 On the other, the potential penalty 
for the offense is the seizure of a commercial aircraft.55 Given the 
ambiguity in the range of possible penalties, it is unclear if the holdings 
of previous cases like Speidel and Alex, which specifically forbid felony 
convictions for negligent conduct, apply to the case. 
Second, the court focuses its discussion of the constitutionality of 
the conviction around a vagueness issue, rather than an awareness of 
wrongdoing or other culpable mental state discussion.56 The refusal to 
identify the implications this decision would have on Speidel, Alex, 
Hentzner, or Kimoktoak reveals that the court might not have thought that 
the principles in those cases apply, although it offers no reason for such 
a conclusion other than mentioning the public welfare doctrine. 
Justice Matthews, noting both of the above arguments in his 
concurring opinion, wrote that the potential six month prison sentence 
upon conviction of the offense distinguished the case from public 
welfare offenses, and “due process requires that there be a culpable 
mental state in every case where a sentence of imprisonment may be 
imposed.”57 However, even Justice Matthews took no issue with 
satisfying the culpability requirement by showing negligence. 
Thus, to this point Speidel, Alex, Hentzner, and Kimoktoak, held that a 
conviction violated the defendant’s right to due process if the State did 
not demonstrate that the defendant had an awareness of wrongdoing.58 
 
 53.  See McGee v. State, 162 P.3d 1251, 1258–59 (Alaska 2007); Kinney v. 
State, 927 P.2d 1289, 1294 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); Steve v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 122 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1994); Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241, 1252 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1983). 
 54.  Rice, 626 P.2d at 108. 
 55.  Id. at 109. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 115. 
 58. See Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 825 (Alaska 1980); Kimoktoak v. 
State, 584 P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska 1978); Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 680–81 (Alaska 
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However, the court in Guest and Rice sanctioned statutes that would 
allow for the defendant to be unaware of one of the circumstances of the 
offense, so long as the defendant should have been aware.59 This is 
equivalent to a negligence standard, which the court expressly rejected 
in Speidel60 and Alex.61  
C.  The Court of Appeals Deals with the Conflicting Case Law 
In Wheeler v. State,62 the Alaska Court of Appeals revisited section 
45.55.210(a) of the Alaska Statutes, the statue at issue in Hentzner, and 
held that the recklessness standard was an “appropriate means of 
implementing the awareness of wrongdoing expressly adopted in 
Hentzner.”63 The court reasoned: 
The subjective component of criminal recklessness seems 
entirely consistent with the awareness of wrongdoing standard. 
When the accused is subjectively ‘aware of and consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk; that his conduct 
may be unlawful or that it may lead to unlawful results,’ it is 
difficult to imagine how he could realistically be said to have 
acted without an awareness of wrongdoing.64 
The court of appeals took care to state that negligence would not meet 
the awareness of wrongdoing requirement, saying, “[t]he definitions 
contained in the Revised Criminal Code for both recklessness—[section 
of 11.81.900(a)(3) of the Alaska Statutes]—and negligence—
[11.81.900(a)(4) of the Alaska Statutes]—were expressly formulated to 
preclude mere civil negligence from forming the basis for a criminal 
conviction.”65 The court rejected civil negligence as a substitute for 
awareness of wrongdoing because it did not to contain a subjective 
aspect and it did not have its criminal counterpart’s requirement of 
“gross deviation”.66 
The total rejection of a negligence standard as to the circumstances 
of the offense undeniably conflicts with Rice and Guest, and neither case 
was cited in the decision. The complete lack of reference to those cases, 
 
1971); Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1969). 
 59.  State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 839 (Alaska 1978); Rice, 626 P.2d at 110. 
 60.  Speidel, 460 P.2d at 80. 
 61.  Alex, 484 P.2d at 681. 
 62.  Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). 
 63.  Id. at 1252. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. (citing Andrew v. State, 653 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)). 
 66.  Id. 
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which stood as controlling law, implies that the Alaska Court of Appeals 
determined that such cases did not apply to the case at hand. The only 
explanation for such reasoning is that the willful violation of the statute 
in Wheeler implicated the awareness of wrongdoing requirement, 
whereas Guest and Rice do not because those violations did not have to 
be violated willfully. 
In Steve v. State,67 the Alaska Court of Appeals revisited the 
awareness of age issue in Guest, holding that placing the burden on the 
defendant to prove the mistake of age did not violate due process 
because the defendant’s awareness of the age of the victim was not an 
element of the crime.68 The court took issue with strict adherence to 
Speidel to the extent that “due process was violated whenever a criminal 
offense did not require proof ‘that [the] one charged with criminal 
conduct had an awareness of consciousness of some wrongdoing’” 
because to do so would forbid crimes such as criminally negligent 
homicide and many “general intent” crimes, additionally arguing that 
such crimes needed to exist in a functioning criminal code.69 
So, in order to allow for such crimes, the court cited Alex to 
conclude that for “general intent” crimes, the defendant need only act 
with an awareness of his positive act.70 It distinguished Speidel, 
Kimoktoak, and Hentzner in that the defendants in those cases all were 
charged with failure to act as required by law, and that the nature of the 
offense as an omission rather than a positive action triggered the 
awareness of wrongdoing requirement.71 It conceded that the case law 
required an awareness of wrongdoing in certain situations other than 
omission offenses,72 and such an argument leaves room to explain that 
convictions for willful violation would also require the same awareness 
of wrongdoing. By distinguishing between omission and positive action 
offenses, the Alaska Court of Appeals found a rule that could reconcile 
the previous case law.  
In Kinney v. State,73 the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction of a defendant who asserted that his due process rights had 
been violated when he did not receive a jury instruction requiring the 
 
 67.  875 P.2d 110 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994). 
 68.  Id. at 123–24. 
 69.  Id. at 120–21 (quoting Alex v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1969)). 
 70.  Id. at 123. 
 71.  Id. Speidel v. State imposed a duty to return the car. 460 P.2d 77, 80 
(Alaska 1969). Kimoktoak v. State imposed a duty to aid. 584 P.2d 25, 31 (Alaska 
1978). Hentzner v. State imposed a duty to register the securities. 613 P.2d 821, 
826 (Alaska 1980). 
 72.  See Steve, 875 P.2d at 123. 
 73.  927 P.2d 1289 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
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prosecution to prove his awareness of the illegality of his conduct.74 The 
court followed Steve in finding that because the crime, the selling of 
alcohol, was a positive action (as opposed to a failure to register the sale 
of alcohol), the government did not have to prove an additional mens 
rea.75 There was no duty to register because the sale of liquor was 
banned by a local vote in a local-option community.76 The court also 
relied on Wheeler to state that the requirement of awareness of 
wrongdoing differed from the requirement of awareness of illegality.77 
Finally, the decision acknowledged the malum in se and malum 
prohibitum distinction outlined by the supreme court in Hentzner, but did 
not rest its decision on such a distinction even though the “‘broad 
societal concurrence’ that the act of selling alcohol is condemnable” in a 
local-option community could qualify the offense as malum in se.78 
Deciding the case on such grounds was unnecessary because the 
positive act of selling alcohol required no additional awareness of 
wrongdoing. 
Ultimately, these three Alaska Court of Appeals decisions created a 
rule consistent with all of the above Alaska Supreme Court cases: a 
defendant could not be convicted of a willful violation or a failure to act 
unless the State proved that the defendant was aware of some 
wrongdoing. In Speidel and Kimoktoak the defendants were liable for 
their failure to act, and so the State had to prove their awareness of 
wrongdoing.79 In Hentzner and Wheeler the defendants were charged 
with willfully violating a statute, and therefore the State had to prove 
their awareness of wrongdoing.80 In Alex, Guest, Rice, Steve, and Kinney, 
the defendants were liable because of their positive actions and the 
relevant statutes did not proscribe willful violation or otherwise impose 
an additional mental state requirement for the government to 
demonstrate. Consequently, the State did not have to prove the 
defendants’ awareness of wrongdoing, and accordingly the defendants 
were liable for their own negligence as to the consequences of their 
conduct.81 The next Section discusses how Hazelwood did not 
 
 74.  Id. at 1294–95. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 1290. See ALASKA STAT. § 4.16.200(b) (1996). 
 77. Kinney, 927 P.2d at 1294. 
 78.  Id. at 1292. 
 79.  Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1969); Kimoktoak v. State, 584 
P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska 1978). 
 80.  Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 825 (Alaska 1980); Wheeler v. State, 659 
P.2d 1241, 1252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). 
 81.  See State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 110 (Alaska 1981) (finding the defendant 
was guilty of games violations while using an airplane); State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 
836, 839 (Alaska 1978) (finding the defendant guilty of statutory rape); Alex v. 
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acknowledge this rule. However, because the court held that the 
defendant did not need to have an awareness of wrongdoing to be 
convicted of a positive action offense, Hazelwood did not defeat the rule 
either. 
II. STATE V. HAZELWOOD 
This Section will discuss State v. Hazelwood, the decision that 
definitively states that a defendant can be convicted for negligent 
conduct without violating his or her due process rights, as there is no 
requirement that the State demonstrate the defendant’s awareness of 
wrongdoing.82 Subsection A explains how Hazelwood properly invoked 
Rice and Guest as important precedents for the claim that a defendant 
could be properly convicted for negligent conduct. Subsection B 
criticizes the decision for not adequately recognizing and addressing the 
Alaska Supreme Court decisions that predated Rice and Guest, as 
Hazelwood blatantly conflicts with much of the language from those 
cases. Finally, Subsection C concludes that despite the contrast in 
language and reasoning, Hazelwood does not fundamentally conflict with 
the requirement of awareness of wrongdoing in cases involving willful 
violation and omission liability. 
A.  Reliance on Rice and Guest 
In State v. Hazelwood, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the 
defendant could be convicted under a theory of negligent conduct, and 
that civil negligence was an acceptable standard under due process.83 In 
support of its argument that negligence meets the mens rea requirement, 
the court offered Guest and Rice.84 It briefly addressed the two opinions, 
stating that in each case negligence was the basis of the offense.85 In 
doing so, the court brushed over the fact that in those cases the 
negligence only pertained to a circumstance surrounding the offense 
and not the conduct itself.86 However, as the circumstance alone 
 
State, 484 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska 1971) (affirming the defendant’s conviction for 
felony escape); Kinney, 927 P.2d at 1294 (affirming defendant’s conviction for 
sale of liquor in a “local-option” community); Steve v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 123 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (affirming defendant’s sexual abuse of a minor). 
 82.  State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 885 (Alaska 1997). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 879. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See id. (finding the defendant in Guest was negligent to the victim’s age, 
and the defendant in Rice was negligent as to the fact that the game was illegally 
taken). 
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separated innocent conduct from criminal conduct, it is correct to state 
that the negligence became the determinative issue. 
Still, the short treatment these cases receive hides that the cases did 
not fully support basing a criminal conviction on negligent conduct. 
Particularly, as mentioned above, Guest did not explicitly state that the 
defendant’s negligence would satisfy the mens rea requirement, and the 
court in Rice did not analyze the mens rea requirement too closely 
because the underlying statute mirrored a public welfare statute and 
because the reasoning ultimately turned on a notice issue. 
B.  Misstatement of Case Law 
The Hazelwood court also downplayed the prevalence of the 
awareness of wrongdoing requirement of due process in the preceding 
case law, and instead argued that the due process requirement stands 
for a principal of deterrence.87 To do so, it cited Alex, misquoting the 
case so as to replace the Alaskan model with the federal standard.88 In its 
discussion of Alex, the court made no mention of the language that 
specifically states, “This court would not then and will not now sanction 
conviction of a serious felony for mere inadvertence or simple neglect.”89 
The Hazelwood court conceded that Speidel stands for the principal 
that some cases require more than negligence, and some require less, but 
it did little to offer a guideline for determining which circumstances 
have which requirement, instead only offering public welfare offense as 
an example that requires less.90 It alluded to a distinction between mens 
rea requirements based upon serious penalties,91 but it did not rest its 
decision on the fact that the statute at issue only provided for 
misdemeanor rather than felony punishment. 
The court also waivered on whether a statutory requirement of 
mens rea, or explicit lack of requirement, trumped the due process 
guarantee against a conviction without an awareness of wrongdoing. It 
cited Rice and stated, “[N]o mental element will be required when a 
statute provides ‘clear legislative intent to the contrary.’”92 Additionally, 
 
 87.  Id. at 884. 
 88.  See id. at 879 (quoting Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska 1971) 
(“The requirement of criminal intent does ‘not emphasize a specific awareness of 
wrongfulness.’”)). The full language from Alex refers to the federal standard as 
opposed to the Alaska standard, and reads, “[T]he [United States] Supreme 
Court did not emphasize a specific awareness of wrongfulness.” 484 P.2d at 681. 
 89.  Alex, 484 P.2d at 681. 
 90.  Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 879–80. 
 91.  See id. at 880 (“As a corollary, a mens rea requirement is imputed only 
when a serious penalty attaches.”). 
 92.  Id. (quoting State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 108 (Alaska 1981)). 
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the court stated, “[e]ven Morissette concedes that the concerns raised by 
the exclusion of mens rea ‘would not justify judicial disregard of a clear 
command to that effect from Congress.’”93 On the other hand, the court 
limited the power of the legislature, stating, “[a]n exception to the mens 
rea requirement for ‘clear legislative intent to the contrary’ has the 
potential to swallow the rule. As we said in Speidel, even where a statute 
is explicit, due process will on occasion require a higher degree of 
culpability.”94 
The court in Hazelwood then explained what it believed to be the 
reasoning behind the due process requirement of mens rea. In doing so it 
cited neither case law nor legal theory, stating: 
Society’s interest in obtaining compliance with its regulations . . 
. can never outweigh the individual’s interest in freedom from 
substantial punishment for a violation he or she could not 
reasonably have been expected to avoid. The threshold 
question, then, is whether the defendant’s conduct is 
something which society could reasonably expect to deter.95 
The court simply stated that negligence met this goal.96 Other than its 
brief recognition of Guest and Rice, it did not explain why, but merely 
battled with the argument that a civil standard is inappropriate for 
criminal sanctions.97 
The court outlined three circumstances in which due process would 
not require not require a “separate mental element.”98 First, the court 
noted, “Persons operating in rule-laden environments, and whose 
actions have a substantial impact on public health, safety, or welfare, can 
reasonably be assumed aware of their governing codes.”99 The court 
said this in support of strict liability for highly regulated areas, a 
proposition offered in Cole v. State.100 Second, the court returned to the 
Hentzner distinction that malum in se offenses inherently contain an 
awareness of wrongdoing.101 Finally, the court stated that an awareness 
of wrongdoing might not be required when the penalty is only a small 
fine under the public welfare offense theory that has been permitted 
 
 93.  Id. at 882 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 n.14 
(1952)). 
 94.  Id. (quoting Speidel v. State, 46 P.2d 77, 80 (1969)). 
 95.  Id. at 883. 
 96.  See id. at 883–85. 
 97.  See id. at 883–84. 
 98.  Id. at 883. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. (citing Cole v. State, 828 P.2d 175, 178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)). 
 101.  Id. at 883–84 (citing Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 826 (Alaska 1980)). 
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since Speidel.102 However, after giving these circumstances, the court did 
not state that any of them apply to the facts at hand. This questions the 
relevancy of the discussion, leaving only the possibility that the court 
listed these circumstances in order to suggest that the due process 
protection can be limited when circumstances require it. Ultimately, 
such a discussion exemplifies the shortcomings in this decision: it 
inadequately summarizes and relies upon case law and engages in lofty 
discussion without applying the conclusion to the facts at hand.103 
C.  Hazelwood Overall 
Despite the apparent contrast between Hazelwood and the preceding 
case law, the facts of Hazelwood do not disturb the formulated rule that 
emerged from the decisions of the court of appeals: the State must prove 
the defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing when the relevant statute 
involves either willful violation or omission liability. In Hazelwood, the 
defendant committed a positive action and the statute required no 
willful violation.104 
Unfortunately, Hazelwood neither mentioned nor relied upon the 
rule that the awareness of wrongdoing requirement would only apply in 
such cases. Instead, the Hazelwood court proposed a new test, asking 
“whether the defendant’s conduct is something which society could 
reasonably expect to deter.”105 Despite the Alaska Supreme Court 
offering this new test, the subsequent due process cases continued to 
follow the rule outlined above as it existed before Hazelwood.  
III. RECENT CASES 
In the supreme and appellate court cases following Hazelwood, the 
inconsistencies between that case and Speidel, Alex, Kimoktoak, and 
Hentzner were clear. All were still good law, as each continued to be 
cited, but no case that cited Hazelwood cited any of the other four.106 For 
the most part, the distinction previously made by the court of appeals 
between omission and positive action liability held. Subsection A will 
show that cases that required an awareness of wrongdoing either 
involved omission liability or willful violation. Likewise, Subsection B 
will show that courts upheld negligence liability in the case of positive 
 
 102.  Id. at 883–84. 
 103.  For an additional critique of Hazelwood, see Perla, supra note 8, at 153–57. 
 104.  See Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 878. 
 105.  Id. at 883. 
 106.  And, intuitively, vice versa. 
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actions. However, Subsection C will discuss how possession liability 
proved difficult to classify as a positive action or omission case. Finally, 
Subsection D will analyze how the court of appeals incorrectly 
characterized flight as a failure to stop in Melson v. Municipality of 
Anchorage.107  
A.  Awareness of Wrongdoing Cases 
After Hazelwood, the court of appeals first returned to due process 
analysis without employing the “reasonably expect to deter” standard in 
Dailey v. State.108 In Dailey, the court considered the requirement of 
awareness of wrongdoing for a conviction for the defendant’s failure to 
file quarterly written verification of sex offender registration.109 The 
court cited Speidel, Alex, and Hentzner to show that the State had a duty 
to prove the defendant “was aware that he had a duty to act.”110 The 
court of appeals explicitly found that requirement necessary, “because 
Dailey was prosecuted for a failure to act.”111 Consequently, omission 
liability triggered the requirement of awareness of circumstances, 
without which the State could not adequately prove the defendant’s 
culpable mental state. 
Later, in Doe v. State,112 the Alaska Supreme Court cited Hentzner in 
order to demonstrate that for mala in se offenses, awareness of the 
conduct suffices for an awareness of wrongdoing.113 The Doe v. State 
court acknowledged the continued existence of the awareness of 
wrongdoing requirement, but did not analyze the issue further because 
the case ultimately turned on an ex post facto issue.114 
In contrast, in McGee v. State,115 the Alaska Supreme Court 
discussed the effect of removing “willfulness” from a criminal statute.116 
McGee cited Hentzner to state that “willfully” had a recognized 
understanding as “requiring the state to prove either a conscious 
‘awareness of wrongdoing’ or the intentional commission of ‘an 
unlawful act without justification or other legal excuse.’”117 So, while the 
old version of a statute—proscribing willful violation—permitted a 
 
 107.  60 P.3d 199 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 108.  65 P.3d 891 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). 
 109.  Id. at 894. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 895. 
 112.  189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008). 
 113.  Id. at 1012–13. 
 114.  See id. at 1019. 
 115.  162 P.3d 1251 (Alaska 2007). 
 116.  Id. at 1258–59. 
 117.  Id. at 1258. 
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mistake of fact defense, the new version of the statute—without the term 
“willful”—would only permit a mistake of fact defense if the 
defendant’s mistake was reasonable.118 
In so doing, the Alaska Supreme Court solidified one half of the 
court of appeals’ rule that the State would have to demonstrate the 
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing if the defendant were charged 
with a willful violation. Removing “willful” from a positive action 
statute removed the requirement of showing a subjective awareness of 
wrongdoing. 
The court further cemented the subjective awareness and 
willfulness standard in State v. Strane.119 In that case, the court analyzed 
the liability of a defendant who violated a protective order but believed 
the order would not apply if the protected party consented.120 The 
defendant sought to invoke Hentzner but the court responded that in 
Hentzner, “while recognizing the ‘awareness of wrongdoing’ standard as 
one that would certainly pass constitutional muster, [the court] stopped 
short of holding that this particular culpable mental state was 
constitutionally necessary.”121 Under this reasoning, Hentzner required 
an awareness of wrongdoing element not because of the constitution, 
but because of the statute under which the defendant was convicted, 
thus confirming that “willful” triggered the subjective awareness of 
wrongdoing requirement. As the violation of the protection order was a 
positive action, and the violation did not require willfulness, a 
conviction did not need an additional showing of subjective awareness 
of wrongdoing. The State demonstrated that the defendant was aware of 
his conduct and aware of the order, in violation of the statute. Since the 
State had no burden to prove anything else, the defendant’s mistake of 
law was irrelevant.122 
Next, in Hutchison v. State,123 the court of appeals considered the 
defendant’s willful failure to appear at his scheduled court date.124 The 
court cited Hentzner for the following proposition: 
 
 118.  Id. at 1258–59. 
 119.  61 P.3d 1284 (Alaska 2003). 
 120.  Id. at 1285. 
 121.  Id. at 1291. 
 122.  Id. at 1292 (“We know of no decision from the domestic violence arena 
supporting Strane’s position. And as the court of appeals observed in Strane, 
courts ruling in the analogous area of criminal contempt routinely apply a 
culpable mental state of reckless disregard, a standard less demanding on the 
prosecution than consciousness of wrongdoing, and one that does not permit 
defenses based on either a pure mistake of law or a good faith but unreasonable 
mistake of fact.”). 
 123.  27 P.3d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). 
 124.  Id. at 775. 
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[T]he crime of failure to appear involves an omission to 
perform a duty—for, in such situations, the definition of 
‘willfulness’ must encompass not only the need to prove the 
voluntariness or purposefulness of the defendant’s conduct, 
but also the need to prove the defendant’s awareness of the 
duty in the first place.125 
Such a statement implies that the awareness of wrongdoing did not 
apply to all cases, but instead applied specifically to omission liability 
and willful violation cases. Ultimately, the court acquitted the defendant 
because the defendant did not act with the conscious purpose of 
avoiding his obligation to appear.126 
 In Trigg v. State,127 the court of appeals considered the defendant’s 
failure to register as a sex offender.128 The court cited Kimoktoak, 
Wheeler,129 and Steve, in support of “the principle that a person can be 
punished for failing to engage in specific conduct only if the person was 
aware of the circumstances that triggered the duty to engage in that 
conduct.”130 Again, in taking such care to make this distinction, the court 
implied that punishment for engaging in conduct, in contrast to failing 
to act, does not have an equally stringent requirement of awareness of 
circumstances. The court refused to resolve whether recklessness or 
knowledge satisfied the awareness of circumstances requirement.131 
Finally, in Willis v. State,132 the court of appeals considered the 
awareness of two parents convicted of “recklessly caus[ing] serious 
physical injury to [their child].”133 Because the prosecutors could not 
determine which parent assaulted the child, the State advanced a theory 
that one defendant assaulted the child and the other failed to protect the 
child.134 Because the State pursued a failure to act theory, the court relied 
on Kimoktoak, stating, “[m]ore specifically, when a defendant is 
prosecuted for failing to act, the State must show that the defendant was 
 
 125.  Id. at 778. 
 126.  Id. at 782. 
 127.  A-7519, 2003 WL 294363 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2003). 
 128.  Id. at *1. 
 129.  The Alaska Court of Appeals summarized Wheeler as a case about the 
defendant’s failure to register, rather than the defendant’s sale of unregistered 
securities. Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at *3. 
 132.  57 P.3d 688 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 133.  Id. at 690. 
 134.  Id. at 693 (“Judge Weeks gave the jurors an instruction that combined 
both theories of criminal responsibility—i.e., responsibility based on personal 
commission of an assault, and responsibility for failing to act to prevent the 
assault.”). 
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aware of the circumstance that triggered the duty to act and that, being 
aware of this circumstance, the defendant chose to do nothing—i.e., 
‘knowingly’ refrained from acting.”135 Again the court of appeals held 
that the omission liability triggered the requirement of awareness of 
circumstances. 
B.  Cases Citing Hazelwood 
Four cases have cited Hazelwood regarding the criminal requirement 
of awareness of wrongdoing. The relevant statutes consistently 
proscribe positive conduct and do not require willful violation; therefore 
negligence satisfies any constitutional requirement of a criminal mental 
state.  
The court of appeals cited Hazelwood approvingly in Solomon v. 
State,136 upholding a DUI conviction under a negligence theory.137 The 
defendant asserted that he had no knowledge of his intoxication, and 
therefore should not be subject to criminal punishment.138 However, the 
court held that the defendant was at least negligent as to his 
intoxication, and therefore could face criminal punishment.139 It made 
no mention of a requirement mandating awareness of wrongdoing, but 
it specifically stated that Hazelwood allowed for a conviction without a 
showing of what the defendant subjectively realized, and instead allows 
for convictions on only a negligence theory.140 
Another DUI case, Valentine v. State,141 mirrors Solomon in that the 
defendant attempted to use Hazelwood to require that the State 
demonstrate that he was at least negligent as to his intoxication.142 The 
court of appeals acknowledged that Hazelwood stood for the premise that 
the State must prove the defendant’s negligence as to an attendant 
circumstance, but, like Solomon, the court of appeals found that his 
negligence was assumed because the defendant knowingly consumed 
 
 135.  Id. at 694. 
 136.  227 P.3d 461 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 
 137.  Id. at 468 (“[T]here must be some level of mental culpability on the part 
of the defendant.  However, this principle does not preclude a civil negligence 
standard.”). 
 138.  Id. at 464. 
 139.  Id. at 469. 
 140.  Id. at 468. 
 141.  155 P.3d 331 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007), rev’d 215 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2009). 
 142.  Id. at 342–43 (For instance, the court in Morgan v. Anchorage explained 
“[i]t certainly does not make sense to allow a defendant to claim that his 
intentional consumption of alcohol impaired his ability to know that he was 
intoxicated.”). 
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enough alcohol to become legally intoxicated.143 
The court of appeals also considered the defendant’s negligence in 
the context of vehicular theft in Latham v. State.144 The relevant statute 
criminalized the taking of a vehicle if the defendant “ha[d] no right to do 
so or any reasonable ground to believe the person ha[d] such a right.”145 
The defendant argued that the State must prove at least recklessness as 
to the circumstance of his right to take the vehicle, as mandated by 
section 11.81.610(b) of the Alaska Statutes.146 However, the court of 
appeals reasoned that section 11.81.610(b) did not apply because 
Hazelwood stood for the principle that “ordinary negligence is the 
included mental state where a defendant is permitted to assert a 
reasonable but mistaken belief as a defense to criminal charges.”147 
Because the statute implicitly provided for a negligence standard, 
section 11.81.601(b) did not apply, and because the statute criminalized a 
positive act, there was no constitutional requirement of a greater 
awareness than negligence. 
In Schmidt v. State,148 the court of appeals considered the liability of 
a defendant “convicted of seven fish and game violations related to 
taking two moose and one brown bear . . . . [Six of the violations] 
required proof that he was not an Alaska resident, and that he was at 
least negligent in claiming that he was an Alaska resident.”149 The court 
cited Hazelwood to demonstrate that the negligence theory is sufficient to 
deter Schmidt and others from similar offenses.150 Again, as this statute 
forbade positive acts under a negligence theory, it did not implicate any 
awareness of wrongdoing or circumstances requirements. 
The four above cases all upheld negligence convictions based on a 
positive action, and did not involve a statutory requirement of willful 
violation.151 In contrast, the cases in the previous subsection that 
involved willful violation or omission liability did still require that the 
State prove an awareness of wrongdoing.152 Therefore, the court of 
 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  A-7198, 2000 WL 1124502 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2000). 
 145.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.360(a) (2000). 
 146.  Latham, 2000 WL 1124502, at *5. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  A-8669, 2005 WL 767071 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2005). 
 149.  Id. at *1. 
 150.  Id. at *6. 
 151.  See Solomon v. State, 227 P.3d 461, 468 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010); Valentine 
v. State, 155 P.3d 331, 342–43 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007); Schmidt, 2005 WL 767071, at 
*6; Latham, 2000 WL 1124502, at *5. 
 152.  See Dailey v. State, 65 P.3d 891, 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); Trigg v. 
State, A-7519, 2003 WL 294363, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2003); Willis v. 
State, 57 P.3d 688, 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); Hutchison v. State, 27 P.3d 774, 
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appeals’ rule on when to apply the awareness of wrongdoing 
requirement discussed in Section II survived Hazelwood and continues to 
be in effect in Alaska. Following this rule provides the best guidance for 
when the courts will require the State to prove the defendant’s 
awareness of wrongdoing. 
C.  The Third Track—Possession Liability 
However, Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage does not fit the above 
mold. In a case decided ten years after Hazelwood, the Alaska Court of 
Appeals overturned the defendant’s conviction for possession of drug 
paraphernalia, finding that it violated the defendant’s due process right 
because the relevant statute did not require a culpable mental state.153 
Section 08.35.010 of the Alaska Statutes defines drug paraphernalia as: 
[A]ny items [sic] whose objective characteristics or objective 
manufacturer’s design indicate that it is intended for use in the 
consumption, ingestion, inhalation, injection or other method 
of introduction of a controlled substance into the human body 
or to facilitate a violation of AS 11.71. [A]ny item where 
circumstances reasonably indicate that the subjective intent of 
[its] possessor is to use it or sell it for the consumption, 
ingestion, inhalation, injection or other method of introduction 
of a controlled substance into the human body or to facilitate a 
violation of AS 11.71.154 
The court recognized that it could follow the United States Supreme 
Court and construe such a definition narrowly so as to limit the statute 
as much as possible in order to only prosecute for possession of items 
which, “by virtue of [their] objective features, i.e. features designed by 
[their] manufacturer [are] principally used with illegal drugs”155 or to 
require proof that the defendant intentionally displayed the item “in a 
manner that appeal[ed] to or encourage[ed] illegal drug use.”156 
However, the court of appeals reasoned that while such a solution may 
survive the national standard, it still did not survive the Alaska due 
process requirement of awareness of wrongdoing.157 Specifically, the 
 
782 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). 
 153.  Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 132 P.3d 1176, 1185 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 154.  ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUN. CODE § 08.35.010 (2006). 
 155.  Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
501 (1982). 
 156.  Id. at 502. 
 157.  See Myers, 132 P.3d at 1186. The court further stated that it falls outside 
of its scope to rewrite the provision to meet due process requirements. Id. 
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court took issue with the language involving “the subjective intent of 
[the] possessor” because it: 
[A]llows a defendant to be convicted of the sale or possession 
of drug paraphernalia when, given the circumstances, a 
reasonable person would believe, or think it likely, that the 
defendant intended to use or sell the item to accomplish or 
further the unlawful introduction of a controlled substance into 
the human body–regardless of whether the defendant actually 
intended this.158 
The court emphasized the part of the statute describing a 
circumstance which would identify an item as drug paraphernalia as 
“[d]irect or circumstantial evidence of [the possessor’s] intent . . . to 
deliver [the item] to persons who [the possessor] . . . should reasonably 
[know] intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of [the state drug 
laws].”159 Myers held that this language essentially created a negligence 
standard.160 The court made the following distinction between negligent 
and reckless mens rea that proved instrumental in its rejection of the 
former: “‘reasonable indication’ is not being used as circumstantial 
evidence of the defendant’s true intention. Rather, ‘reasonable 
indication’ is all that must be proved.”161 
The court reiterated the due process guarantee that the State must 
show that the defendant acted with some awareness of wrongdoing, and 
then cited Hentzner, Kimoktoak, Alex, and Speidel in support of this 
principle, noticeably ignoring Rice, Guest, and Hazelwood.162 
If Hazelwood, Rice, and Guest (followed by Valentine, Solomon, 
Schmidt, and Latham) apply to positive action cases, while Speidel, 
Hentzner, and Kimoktoak (followed by Dailey, Hutchison, Trigg, and Willis) 
apply to omission liability, then perhaps Myers creates precedent that 
possession liability, like omission liability and unlike positive action 
liability, would require an awareness of wrongdoing in order to support 
a conviction.163 
 
 158.  Id. at 1184. 
 159.  Id. (quoting ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUN. CODE § 08.35.010 (2006)). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 1185. 
 162.  Id. at 1185 n.17. 
 163.  The comments to the Model Penal Code contain some language 
analogizing possession to omission liability. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) cmt. 4 
(1985) (“An actor who is aware of his control of the thing possessed for a period 
that would enable him to terminate control has failed to act in the face of a legal 
duty imposed by the law that makes his possession criminal.”). See also JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 97 (5th ed. 2009) (“‘possession’ is 
equivalent to an omission, in which the defendant has a statutory duty to 
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 As the Alaska Court of Appeals applied the same awareness of 
wrongdoing requirement to possession liability offenses that it had 
reserved for omission liability offenses, it appears that it also considered 
possession liability a form of omission liability. Taking such an 
approach, Myers provides yet another example of how to remedy the 
apparent contradictions in the case law through separating omission and 
positive action liability. 
D.  Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage 
Finally, in Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage,164 the court of 
appeals considered the defendant’s awareness in his conviction for his 
“resisting or interfering with a police investigation by fleeing after 
having been told to stop.”165 The court cited Kimoktoak in its holding that 
the municipality must have shown that defendant was aware of the 
command to stop.166 Here, however, the defendant’s flight was a 
positive act, and therefore should not have required an awareness of 
circumstances. Thus, this case stands in stark contrast to the developed 
rule. 
However, in reaching its decision, the court of appeals cited 
Kimoktoak as a case where the defendant was “convicted of leaving the 
scene of an accident.”167 While that is perhaps a common summary of 
the offense, the defendant in Kimoktoak violated section 28.35.060 of the 
Alaska Statutes, “Duty of operator to give information and render 
assistance,”168 and to classify that statute as leaving the scene of an 
accident is to disregard the nature of the offense as a crime by omission. 
Thus, Melson suffers from one of two defects: either the court 
mischaracterized Kimoktoak as a positive action offense and consequently 
decided this case using a misunderstanding of the precedent, or it found 
the distinction between positive action liability and omission liability 
inconsequential to the awareness of wrongdoing requirement. Either 
way, the decision, if followed in future cases, would destroy the rule 
used in the previous decisions. The result would leave practitioners with 
no way to reconcile cases like Strane and Trigg, much less Speidel and 
Hazelwood. 
Perhaps for this reason, Melson has not been widely followed, as 
 
dispossess herself of the property”). 
 164.  60 P.3d 199 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 165.  Id. at 201. 
 166.  Id. at 203. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska 1978). 
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Dailey, Doe, McGee, Strane, Trigg, Solomon, Valentine, and Schmidt were all 
decided after the case. Even within Melson, the awareness of the 
command to stop received minimal attention, and could have easily 
been resolved through statutory interpretation169 rather than the due 
process argument that underlies the other cases. Instead of shattering 
the rule that the State must prove the defendant’s awareness of 
wrongdoing in willful violation and omission liability cases but not in 
others, this case better serves as an example of how easy it is to blur the 
distinction between omission liability and positive action liability. The 
court of appeals in this case misclassified the underlying offense in 
Hentzner as fleeing the scene rather than failing to stop and render aid, 
while the offense in this case, resisting arrest, operated much more as a 
failure to stop than a positive action. The ease with which positive action 
and omission liability can be blurred demonstrates the fundamental 
flaw with the functioning distinction. 
IV. THE ACTUS REUS SHOULD NOT DETERMINE THE MINIMAL 
LEVEL OF MENS REA 
The case law divisions of positive action, omission liability, and 
possession liability do not seem to come from an intent to place 
additional requirements on omission and possession liability, but rather 
from the courts simply trying to make a rule to reconcile the conflicting 
results in the jurisprudence. While the distinction between omission and 
positive action liability satisfies stare decisis, it should not continue to 
serve as the functioning rule, if for no other reason than the potential for 
confusion as demonstrated in Melson. To premise a constitutional 
requirement on such an easily blurred distinction can create 
unmanageable ambiguity and lead to otherwise insignificant changes in 
phrasing that alter the rights of defendants. 
First, difficulty can arise even in the simple step of attempting to 
identify omission liability. The definition of the term ranges from 
“omissions are the willed absence of bodily movements, or willed 
nonmotion”170 to “[i]llegal omissions are simply the failure to do what is 
required by law.”171 Using the former definition, a violation of section 
28.35.060 of the Alaska Statutes, as seen in Kimoktoak, might not qualify 
as an omission: a defendant who drives away from the scene of the 
 
 169.  Either through reading the term “recklessly,” which is already in the 
statute, or through applying section 11.81.610(b) of the Alaska Statutes. 
 170.  Fletcher, supra note 15, at 1444. 
 171.  Patricia Smith, Legal Liability and Criminal Omissions, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
69, 69 (2001). 
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accident would be committing a positive act in that they would be 
willing their motion. However, the second definition is clearly more 
applicable, because the conduct that the legislature intended to 
incriminate through such a statute is the failure to give information and 
to render assistance. Overall, the range in definitions demonstrates the 
dangers of premising an awareness requirement on a term with varying 
meaning because of the potential for inconsistent results. 
Second, the traditional arguments for distinguishing between 
omission and positive action liability do not apply in a number of these 
cases. Some proponents of clearly distinguishing omission liability from 
positive action liability argue: 
[T]hat prohibiting actions represents a lesser incursion in our 
liberty than requiring particular actions (that is, punishing their 
omission). As the argument goes, it is less intrusive to prohibit 
flag burning than it is to require children to pledge allegiance 
to the flag. The former only eliminates one of many ways of 
expressing contempt for the state; the latter requires people to 
submit their bodies to motions dictated by the state.172 
However, the cases of Wheeler and Hentzner provide examples of 
how a slight change of wording would switch the offense from a 
positive action offense to an omission offense, without changing the 
quantity of conduct proscribed. As written, the statute invoked in those 
cases, section 45.55.070 of the Alaska Statutes, proscribed the sale of a 
security unless it was registered.173 However, the statute could easily 
have been written as, “a person shall register all securities that the 
person offers for sale. Failure to do so . . .” The language would 
proscribe and compel virtually the same conduct, but would face 
different awareness requirements under the current jurisprudence. That 
the Alaska Court of Appeals in Trigg misstated section 45.55.070 of the 
Alaska Statutes as an omission offense further exemplifies how the 
distinction has been blurred, and how the fundamental reasoning for 
making such a distinction has lost its meaning.174 
Third, as the awareness of circumstances and awareness of conduct 
argument was championed as an effort “to avoid criminal liability for 
innocent or inadvertent conduct,”175 distinguishing between positive 
action and omission liability often does not accomplish that goal. An 
 
 172.  Fletcher, supra note 15, at 1446. 
 173.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.070 (1983). 
 174.  See Trigg v. State, A-7519, 2003 WL 294363, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 
12, 2003) (stating that the issue is whether knowingly describes the conduct of 
failing to register or the awareness of the duty to register). 
 175.  Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska 1971). 
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individual can cause harm, and therefore not be innocent, through non-
action just as easily as through action.176 Critics have offered numerous 
hypotheticals in which inaction greatly mirrors action and in which the 
culpability of a non-actor appears as great as a positive actor. For 
example, “[a] mother’s failure to feed her child is readily treated as the 
affirmative act of neglect or starvation, and thus virtually every Western 
legal system would include this case within the ambit of criminal 
homicide. Whether the mother remains motionless as the baby dies is 
totally irrelevant.”177 In such an example, the harm caused is the focus 
and is what qualifies the mother as a guilty individual, rather than any 
specific action or non-action, and it is pointless to create a rule that if the 
mother caused the death through inaction she has more due process 
rights for the prosecution to overcome than if the mother caused the 
death through some action. Willis demonstrates this point because the 
relevant statute focused on the result, not the means in which it was 
achieved. Because the prosecution pursued a theory of omission liability 
it faced an additional hurdle of demonstrating the awareness of the 
circumstances of the defendants’ inaction.178 When the harm caused 
rather than the manner in which the defendant caused it determines the 
culpability of the defendant, premising a due process protection on 
whether the defendant committed an action or failed to act does not 
further the goal of protecting innocent behavior. 
Two sets of comparisons between cases already introduced 
highlight these arguments. First, the defendant in Rice was convicted 
despite only being negligent to what he was transporting.179 In contrast, 
the defendant in Myers could not be convicted because of his negligence 
 
 176.  See Smith, supra note 171, at 83–84. “At the same time, however, it must 
also be acknowledged that ‘allowing’ (like ‘causing’) is a success verb, that is, 
you cannot let something happen unless it happens. In other words, it is 
necessarily the case that if you let something happen, it happened. This point 
creates some tension with the idea that allowing something to happen is nothing 
more than the absence of a potential causal factor, but it must be included in a 
full account because it is a conceptually necessary feature of what it means to let 
something happen.” Id. 
 177.  Fletcher, supra note 15, at 1448. 
 178.  See Willis v. State, 57 P.3d 688, 690 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (“[T]he 
indictment was based on the theory that one of them had personally assaulted 
the infant while the other had knowingly stood by and allowed the assault to 
happen—thus violating their parental duty to protect the child and rendering 
them criminally liable for the resulting injuries.”). 
 179.  State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 110 (Alaska 1981). The court argued that such 
reasoning was necessary in order to promote the legitimate, regulatory purpose 
of the statute. Any other interpretation would be inapposite to the statute’s aims. 
Id. 
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as to the items he was possessing.180 Does the fact that the defendant in 
Rice was moving transform the action so much that the two statutes 
invoke two different liability regimes? An advocate of the distinction 
would answer affirmatively, pointing to the nature of moving the illicit 
cargo as an act that, whether the defendant knows it or not, furthers a 
criminal enterprise in some trafficking sense. However, drawing the line 
at basic, unwitting motion between these two crimes seems too arbitrary 
to create such a distinction between such similar offenses.  
Second, comparing Melson to Kimoktoak, the court of appeals 
required the same level of awareness of both offenses; in one case the 
defendant failed to stop at the order of a police officer, while in the other 
the defendant failed to stop at a scene of an accident.181 In both cases 
penalizing a defendant who did not know of the circumstances, the 
order to stop or the occurrence of an accident, seemed patently unfair, 
and so the court of appeals in Melson applied the same requirement as 
did the supreme court in Kimoktoak. However, if this distinction between 
omission and positive action were to be more firmly cemented in case 
law, the defendant in Melson might have faced different awareness 
requirements because he was not convicted of the omission of failing to 
stop, but rather the positive action of fleeing. This change, though small, 
alters the liability of the defendant and the minimal awareness that the 
State must prove. 
Classifying an act as fleeing rather than failing to stop, or leaving 
the scene rather than failing to give aid, is too arbitrary a distinction. 
That the court of appeals in Melson misstated the underlying conduct in 
Kimoktoak as a positive action offense demonstrates the potential for 
misapplication. The potential for inconsistency exemplifies why 
Alaska’s jurisprudence should not premise an awareness of wrongdoing 
requirement on a term as difficult to define and as morally irrelevant as 
omission liability. However, without such a reliance on omission 
liability, the courts would face the difficult task of explaining the 
rivaling case law. 
CONCLUSION 
The rule that the prosecution must prove the defendant’s 
awareness of wrongdoing in cases involving willful violation or 
omission liability effectively distinguishes conflicting cases such as 
 
 180.  Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 132 P.3d 1176, 1185 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 181.  See Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 60 P.3d 199, 203 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2002) (“[T]he actus reus of this offense is the defendant’s act of flight”). 
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Speidel and Hazelwood. This rule has largely been followed since 
Hazelwood, has expanded to include possession liability within omission 
liability, and provides the best guideline for practitioners to follow to 
determine when the courts will require the State to prove the 
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing. 
However, the part of the rule that premises the requirement to 
demonstrate the defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing on omission 
liability should be abandoned: distinguishing between positive action 
and omission often fails to make meaningful distinctions between 
conduct committed by the defendant, freedoms restricted by the 
government, or innocence of the defendant. Consequently, following 
this rule already has and will continue to give due process protection to 
defendants in some cases but not in other substantially similar ones. 
Therefore, the courts must decide if requiring the prosecution to 
demonstrate the defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing is worthy of 
universal application, total abandonment, or a new rule that would 
provide for a more reasoned selection of when to apply the requirement. 
Until that time, the existing rule, even if partially based upon an 
arbitrary distinction, allows lawyers to distinguish between 
fundamentally conflicting cases and provides an estimate of when 
future courts will require the State to prove the defendant’s awareness 
of wrongdoing. 
